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Introduction
Malays are Moslems and Islam is the symbol of their identity. The modern world
has evoked various responses in the sphere of religion. Remarkable changes in such
religious behavior as daily prayer, Friday assembly, pilgrimage, and religious offerings
have been observed in urban areas, while changes in rural areas seem to be limited to
certain institutions. I would like to present some of these in this short note.
I Weakening Educational Function
Pondok, which literally means a hut, denotes a particular type of religious school.
The name derives from the small huts surrounding religious teacher's residence and
teaching place (madrassah), where students live and cater for themselves. Pondok schools
are found in the northern states of the Malay Peninsula, in some provinces of southern
Thailand, and in Java and Aceh in Indonesia. The teachers at these pondok schools
are supposed to have spent a long time studying in other pondok schools or at some
institution in Mecca. They open their pondok schools on their own or their parents'
land, or on a piece of land donated for religious purposes. The popularity and repu-
tation of a particular pondok school depends on the teacher's personality and experience,
and, in this sense, it will last only for one generation, although in fact it may be continued
by the teacher's son or son-in-law.
At a famous pondok school, the students are expected to attain a high level of religious
knowledge, to be able to read Arabic and write ]awi, and to understand the Islamic
law system. At an unknown rural pondok school the curriculum is very poor. Thus,
the number of years spent at a pondok does not necessarily reflect the level of education.
For example, the villagers of Galok in Kelantan attained only very low literacy through
their pondok education; if they had spent less than two years at the pondok school, they
could barely read and write (see Table 1).
Pondok schools were important forces in the socialization of youth before formal
secular education was introduced into rural Malay communities, and they are still
important to Thai-speaking Moslems who live among Buddhists for transmitting the
Islamic religion to their descendants. Thus, the number of boys at pondoks in Thailand
has shown no sign of decrease. In contrast, the recent spread of formal education in
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Malaysia, especially at the lower secondary level in the Malay medium, has been
threatening pondok education. Moreover, as the roman alphabet (rumi) is taught at
secular schools, the use of Jawi, taught at pondok schools, is becoming more limited.
A remarkable decrease in pondok school experience is found among Galok villagers;
almost half of those over fifty years in 1970 had stayed for sometime at a pondok school
in their youth, while only 12.50/0 of villagers in their twenties had been to a pondok
school (see Table 2).
Table I Literacy of Galok Villagers by Years of Staying in Pondok School
------------
Literacy
Illiterate Can Read]awi Can Read Both Total
Years
-----"------
but not Rumi ] awi and Rumi
less than 1 year 1 1
1 year 5 1 6
2 years 2 2
3 years 5 2 1 8
4 years 1 1
5 years 2 2 1 5
6 years 1 1
7 years 1 1
8 years & more 1 1 1 3
Total 17 8 3 28
Table 2 Pondok Experience of Galok Male Residents
by Age-Group
Age-Group Total Those Experienced 0/Population Pondok Education /0
20-29 40 5 12.5
30-39 36 9 25.0
40-49 30 12 40.0
50- 38 18 47.4
Total 144 44 30.6
In spite of the general decrease of pondok students, the number of students in some
famous pondok schools has not decreased because of the good education they offer.
Some attract students from even more distant states than before. Some are trying to
modernize by introducing other subjects. Here I will describe one such school near
Kota Bharu. It was founded in 1931 by the present teacher's grandfather. In 1970,
about three hundred huts were arranged in a three-acre compound. Most of the
residents were boys, although about fifty old people and fifty girls were also living there.
The girls' residential area was separated from that of the boys. The girls were attending
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the Arabic school next door started by the present teacher in 1958, which provided not
only religious education but also a secular one to those who had completed their primary
education. The original pondok school was run by three religious teachers, and thirteen
new teachers were employed in the Arabic school.
Enrollment of youth in small rural pondok schools has however declined. The pondok
school in Galok falls in this category. It was founded by the present religious teacher
(who was 57 years old in 1970) in 1937 using one acre of his father's land. He studied
religion at pondok schools in the vicinity when he was young and visited Mecca as an
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Fig. 1 Plan of Galok Pondok School
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Fig. 2 Residents of Galok POlldok Area by Sex and Age-Group
Table 3 Number of Households in Galok Pondok Area by Category and Years Stayed
Category Religious Ordinary Single
Years Teacher Youth Aged Household Males Total& his Kins
less than I year 3 2 5
I year 6 6
2 years 2 2 4
3 years 2 2
4 years 5 5
5 years I 3 4
G years 2 I 3
7 years 1 1
8 years :2 2
9 years 1 I
10 years 2 3 6
II years
12 years
13 years 2 2
14 years
15 years & more 4 2 5 II
unknown 1 I
---.._._-----_._._.
Total 7 5 32 7 2 53
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period, but by 1960 there were only about twenty, and in 1970 only five boys were
studying there (see Figs. 1, 2, Table 3). In obscure pondok schools near towns the
number of boys was increasing, as many used the pondok school as a place to stay so they
could attend the secular school in town. Most of the educational functions of the
pondok schools have been transferred to formal secular schools.
n Reinforced Mediatory Functions
The religious teacher of a pondok school is often believed to have some magical
power endowed by God. He sometimes prepares purifying water and amulet papers
for the villagers, who say that he has such magical power that he can prevent his two
wives from quarreling. Praying with him is believed to be effective for entering heaven
after death. Traditionally, a religious teacher performed two different functions at
the same time; an educational function through his knowledge and a mediatory function
through his magical power. The latter function is becoming more important as he is
losing his educational role. Although the educational system in some of the famous
pondok schools has been improved in response to the times, many rural pondok schools
now accomodate the aged who wish to pray with a teacher endowed with supernatural
powers. A polarization is now taking place among the pondok schools.
The number of old people in small obscure pondok schools has obviously increased.
In 1970, three-fifths of the huts of the Galok pondok school mentioned earlier were occu-
pied by old people, thirty of whom, the majority, were old women. Only two old men
were staying there, one with his wife, the other with his grandchild. These old people
were mostly from villages within ten miles. Some of the old women continued to
work, some rented out their paddy fields or rubber estates for a small sum, and others
were dependent on their children, grandchildren, or other kin (see Table 4).




T 1 1 Partly Supportedor .A~~" .~~ TotalIncome by Assisted by Others
Own Means (M$) -~--------
0 11 11
1- 49 3 3
50- 99 1 3 4







Total 10 11 11 32
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The spiritual tie with the religious teacher and the daily association with other old
people encouraged not only to those who had lost their near relatives but also those who
still have them. Some of the old women prefer pondok life to family life with their
married children, and thus life at a pondok has a positive meaning as a chosen alternative.
Five of the thirty-two old people have visited Mecca as pilgrims, on the government-
chartered pilgrim boat.
Changes in the character of pondok schools were observed not only in Kelantan
but also even earlier in Kedah. The survival of a pondok school now often depends on
old people. But the fact that the personality of the aged religious teacher attracts the
old people suggests the possibility of decline of a pondok school after the death of the
present teacher.
In Malay villages, one or two married children traditionally established independent
households in their parents' compound, which custom offers a mechanism for avoiding
both conflicts between and isolation of the two generations. The increasing numbers
of old people entering pondoks cannot be attributed to pressures from homelife. In spite
of this, lack of demand by village society for pondok schools are beginning to function
as old people's homes. Although it may be desirable to provide these pondok schools
with some kind of subsidy so that they can, in fact, be reorganized into old people's
homes, this is not likely just yet. The present situation will be a transient phase.
ITI Re-interpretation of the Islamic Idea
Islam is an important foreign element which sets behavioral criteria for the Malays.
Islamic law is extremely adaptable in its application. Here I will give an example
concerning the treatment of divorce. The following four types of divorce are permitted
under the law. (a) Talak is a unilateral repudiation by the husband; (b) pasah is
divorce granted by a religious judge in cases where the whereabouts of one spouse is
unknown; (c) tebus talak means the wife purchases talak, and this is used in cases where
the wife wants a divorce; (d) ta'alik is divorce which can be requested by the wife if
the husband contravenes special conditions agreed to in the marriage contract. Actu-
ally most divorces are obtained through talak in Malay society. Talak does not need
the wife's consent and can be carried out freely. In addition, the husband will almost
automatically consent to the wife's proposal of divorce, meaning that divorce can take
place very easily. On the other hand, according to Hadith (tradition), God finds divorce
the most offensive of all acts tolerated by Him, and this opinion may be emphasized as
a deterrent. Thus, diametrically opposed interpretations of Islamic law are possible,
and any interpretation may be fully upheld by the religion.
The kinship structure of Malay society readily allows divorce. This is supported
by the fact that in the society of the Jakun proto-Malays, whose kinship structure is
almost identical to that of the Malays but who have not been influenced by Islam, divorce
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IS quite common, though not as common as in Malay society. Thus, when Islamic
law was accepted by such a society it is likely that divorce become much easier. One
reason is that divorce can be justified as an individual's action in God's name and it
is free from the community control which prevails in tribal societies. Conversely,
contact with Christian society, or with the traditional thinking of Christianity that
divorce should not be permitted, has led to emphasis of similar thinking in the Islamic
tradition. This thinking has probably spread through the initiatives of the intellectual
and the religious elites rather than developing from the populace.
Of three villages investigated, the traditional type of divorce in accordance with
Islamic law is found in Galok in Kelantan.U In place of a kathi, the imam of the village
handles the notice of divorce in an impartial, businesslike manner. A husband issuing
a declaration of talak must pay a M$12 registration fee to the religious court, 40% of
which is retained by the imam. This sum exceeds the daily wage of a laborer and is
imcome which the imam cannot ignore.
The Malays of Melaka, because of the location of their state, have frequent contact
with Europeans and Chinese and the influence from their cultures is considerable.
In about 1960, the State Religious Department (Jabatan Ugama Islam) was set up, the
number of religious judges was reduced and the system of religious administration was
unified. This office is instrumental in discouraging divorce; the religious judge and
his representative, the imam, try to persuade people who come to resister a divorce to
give up the idea. In addition, a famous religious teacher who happened to live in the
village surveyed (Bukit Pegoh) also stressed the undersirability of divorce. The village
in Kedah, Padang Lalang, falls somewhere between these two, tending toward the
traditionalism of Kelantan (see Table 5).
Table 6 shows the marriage and divorce statistics of the three states in which the
three villages are located. Judging from the ratio of the number ofdivorces to marriages,
the divorce trend is highest in Kelantan, followed by Kedah and Melaka. The divorce
rate in Melaka has been low since early times. From 1962, however, it showed a phe-
nomenal decrease, and in 1966-1970 was only 12 per 100 marriages. In contrast to
Melaka, divorce in Kelantan has traditionally been as frequent as 80 per 100 marriages.
Recently there has been a gradual decline in the divorce rate, though without the sharp
drop seen in Melaka, and in 1966-1970 the divorce rate was 56 per 100 marriages.
This decrease is clearly observable in coastal districts but is not so clear in inland areas.
In Kedah, it is not possible to ascertain the trend clearly because of lack of data, but a
slight decline is observed in 1964 compared with the figures for pre-1957.
Change is not only taking place in Malaysia. Followers of Islam in Singapore
(mainly Malays) in recent years have registered a decrease in the number of divorces.
1) See Yoshihiro Tsubouchi, "Islam and Divorce among Malay Peasants," in Shinichi Ichimura edited
Southeast Asia: Nature, Society and Development (Kyoto: The Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1976).
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% Ever- Ever- %Married Divorced
_.-----_.._----<._..-
11 1 9.1
9.7 40 8 20.0
27.3 34 13 38.2
46.7 38 19 50.0
68.2 23 12 52.2
62.5 19 8 42.1
----------_.----




NotGroup Ever- Ever- Not % Ever- Ever- %Married Divorced Clear Married Divorced Clear
10-19 5 1
20-29 29 3 10.3 57 10 4 17.5
30-39 58 7 12.1 61 7 3 11.5
40-49 37 8 21.6 31 6 2 19.4
50-59 23 5 21.7 32 6 7 18.8




Total 173 33 2 19.1 217 36 27 16.6
-,--,._--_._-,._._._--_.__ . __.~ .' ..'.----- -_._.",._..... - ~ .,-_.__.'----._,--
._, -----_._--,'.__._'.'--
Changes in number of marriages and divorces among Moslems in Singapore are shown
in Table 7. The decrease in divorce in Singapore, even more than in Melaka, has been
promoted institutionally, backed by the law reform of 1957 (effective from December
1958) and the concomitant establishment of a matrimonial court. The law was
strengthened in 1966 to further restrict divorce. In comparison, the role of local Moslem
leaders in Singapore has not been as great as in Melaka; although divorce is condemned
as offending the will of God, in practice it is controlled by using the law.
In Indonesia, too, there have developed various movements to restrict divorce.
As Table 8 shows, a decrease in the number of divorces appeared from about 1965.
Changes in number of marriages and divorces in Java by region show a remarkable
decline in divorce in the cultural centers of Java, including the cities of Jakarta and
Yogyakarta.
The kinship structure of the Malays freely permits divorce. If Islam had not
entered Malay society, this characteristic of the kinship structure would have been
reflected directly in the phenomenon of divorce, which undoubtedly was common.




Table 7 Marriages and Divorces among Moslems in Singapore
Divorces Divorces
Year Marriages Divorces per 100 Year Marriages Divorces per 100
Marriages Marriages
1921 2,055 1,133 55.1 1950 2,506 1,501 59.9
1922 2,073 1,239 59.8 1951 2,699 1,526 56.6
1923 2,113 1,205 57.0 1952 2,658 1,474 55.5
1924 3,089 1,285 41.6 1953 2,445 1,417 58.0
1925 2,616 1,311 50.1 1954 2,457 1,357 55.2
1926 2,633 1,335 50.7 1955 2,472 1,247 50.4
1927 2,554 1,466 57.4 1956 2,414 1,074 44.5
1928 2,556 1,421 55.6 1957 2,303 1,201 52.1
1929 2,469 1,428 57.8 1958 2,332 1,149 49.3
1930 2,307 1,366 52.9 1959 2,116 577 27.3
1931 2,177 1,264 58.1 1960 1,814 574 31.6
1932 2,084 1,277 61.3 1961 1,560 401 25.7
1933 2,006 1,260 62.8 1962 1,483 447 30.1
1934 2,163 1,132 52.3 1963 1,690 430 25.4
1935 2,070 1,159 56.0 1664 1,698 324 19.1
1936 2,039 1,182 58.0 1965 1,928 365 19.0
1937 2,320 1,208 52.1 1966 1,911 301 15.8
1938 2,065 1,241 60.1 1967 1,894 374 19.7
1939 2,014 1,145 56.9 1968 1,971 200 10.1
1940 2,213 1,249 56.4 1969 1,972 244 12.4
1941 2,440 1,267 51.9 1970 2,272 219 9.6
1942 2,949 1,139 38.6 1971 2,471 241 9.8
1943 3,582 1,705 47.6 1972 2,662 no data
1944 2,907 2,165 74.5
1945 2,982 2,046 68.6
1946 3,095 1,734 56.0
1947 2,784 1,588 57.0
1948 2,605 1,545 59.3
1949 2,516 1,401 55.7
Source: 1921-1964 Djamour (1959), p. 117 and Djamour (1966), p. 129, p. 183; 1965-1968
Singapore Year Book 1968, p. 80; 1969-1970 Singapore 1971, p. 262; and 1971-1972 Singapore
1972, p. 63, p. 265.
to limit it. In the former case, the interpretation of Islamic law which justifies divorce
as an individual's action in God's name further facilitated divorce. In the latter case,
the restraint on divorce should be explained by the response of Islam to a wave of
modernization rather than by the simple idea that the elements of restraint are inherent
in Islam. The significance of religion is not lost, but a re-interpretation is taking place.
And the movement originating in towns is now slowly permeating the rural areas.
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Table 8 Marriages and Divorces among Moslems in Indonesia (in thousands)
Year Marriages Divorces Rojok Divorces per Rojok per100 Marriages 100 Divorces
1950 1,276 629 43 49.3 6.8
1951 1,443 815 61 56.5 7.5
1952 1,310 783 59 59.8 7.5
1953 1,417 723 76 51.0 10.5
1954 1,383 735 56 53.1 7.6
1955 1,313 760 62 57.9 8.2
1956 1,086 584 42 53.8 7.2
1957 1,148 598 40 52.1 6.7
1958 1,242 672 49 54.1 7.3
1959 1,320 697 56 52.8 8.0
1960 1,254 654 55 52.2 8.4
1961 1,162 606 48 52.2 7.9
1962 1,036 593 45 57.2 7.6
1963 1,321 670 56 50.7 8.4
1964 1,130 613 46 54.2 7.5
1965 1,178 578 48 49.1 8.3
1966 1,097 513 37 46.8 7.2
1967 804 325 20 40.4 6.2
1968 1,042 468 24 44.9 5.1
1969 1,099 411 24 37.4 5.8
1970 854 298 11 34.9 3.7
1971 867 276 9 31.8 3.3
1972 989 303 10 30.6 3.3
1973 768 238 8 31.0 3.4
1974 785 217 8 27.6 3.7
Source: The Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia, each year from 1953-1963 and
the 1970-1971, 1972-1973 and 1974-1975 editions.
Concluding ReDlarks
Religion is fundamentally challenged by modernization. I have examined the
response of the Malays in three different spheres. First, the weakening educational
function of religious schools for young people; second, reinforced ties between religious
teachers and old people in thepondok school; third, re-interpretation of religious teaching
and laws regulating divorce. In all these instances, the function of religion in Malay
society is clearly observed, even though the religion itself may be subject to attack. In
contrast, it seems that secular ideas have played a more important role in Japan. For
example, the decrease of divorce which occurred in Japan before World War II was
supported not by religious ideas, but by a re-interpretation of the ie (traditional family
system) and the newly introduced Western idea of the conjugal family. The seculari-
zation of the activities of priests in Japan, which was supported by hereditary professions,
was remarkable. Islam which lacks a hereditary priesthood and depends on the per-
sonality of the leader may well follow a different course in response to modernization.
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Conunents
by AFIFUDDIN Hj. Omar*
Before I comment on the content of Dr. Tsubouchi's paper in a logical manner,
I would like to state my bias and epistemological orientations. I think it is the function
of structural functionalists whether in anthropology or sociology to consider the cultural
variable as the determining factor. However, I am trained in a different school of
thought in that I consider cultural variables as a reflection of the economic situation
or the economic structure. My comments, therefore, will be based purely on this per-
spective. Secondly, I will comment on the question of the relevance of the data to the
conclusions made and, thirdly, I will try to comment on the question of the findings for
development planning apart from satisfying my intellectual curiosity.
The question that I would like to pose and that I observe even for the other papers,
is the bias to the Weberian approach which suggests the moulding of Malay values
within a rationality framework as propagated by Max Weber in his famous or what
some sociologists say is his major practical joke in sociology, that is, that the Protestant
Ethic is central to development. In my view, the socio-economic elements of Malay
society should be considered seriously in the analysis rather than the controlling function
of cultural values and attitudes over the economic activities and orientations of the
Malay people. I will touch on Prof. Kuchiba's work in the Muda region which I
am most familiar with to show how or on what basis comparisons of Malay and Japanese
societies can or cannot be made. My question here is why look only on tradition as
the determining factor. Why not look on the socio-economic values or the everyday
life functions of the Malay people? For instance, taking the content of the 'study by
Dr. Tsubouchi, the economic role of the pondok is not shown. In my study in the
Muda region and also in Zaharah Mahmud's study on the historical geography of
Kedah and Perlis, the role ofpondok institutions has been as the major economic initiator
in the settlement of the region as a whole, in the opening of Kedah state and the Muda
region. This is a very important indication that pondok institutions are not merely
religious institutions, they are a medium whereby the l\1alay people are modernized,
not in the Weberian sense but in the creation of a Malay egalitarian society. If one
sees the development of most of the rice plains in the country like the Muda, Kemubu
and Krian, the facilitating role of the pondok institution can be observed. In Krian,
the semanggol institution was the major force in bringing a new consciousness to this
Malay territory. This was especially true during the Japanese occupation during which
the semanggol institution, pondok or madrassah became the major synthesizer of Malay
political beliefs and facilitated Malay modernization. In the Muda region itself
* Head, Agricultural Division, Muda Agricultural Development Authority, Malaysia
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where most of the pondoks in the country are found, they reflected the Malay nationalistic
movements during the war and post-war periods. The ulama played an important role
in setting up the Seberkas which was formed on socialistic-economic principles. This
later turned into a cooperative effort and, later, became one of the precursor parties
of the present UMNO. This is what I mean in attempting to define the role of the
pondok institution as an initiator in the development of Malay society.
The second question is: "has Islam itself played a predominant role in influencing
the attitudes and values of the Malay people?" Is it Islam acting as a body of beliefs,
a body of theological, political and economic beliefs which influenced Malay cultural
attitudes? The author himself mentioned the supernatural leadership of the ulama or
the guru pondok. As we know, most Malays, whether urban or rural, are mainly nominal
Muslims. The role of the ulama or the pondok leader is very important in structuring
or re-structuring the beliefs of the rural Malays particularly. So my question relates
to whether Islam has played a predominant role and function and whether this itself
has been changing, as implied in the title of the paper.
Finally, the question of the utility of the findings to development planning arises.
This is an area where we must be very careful in terms of interpreting the findings which
take on different paradigms which I will not touch upon because I am not an expert
in Islamic knowledge.
I would like now to go on to Prof. Kuchiba's study which is related to what I have
just mentioned about: its utility to development planning. Prof. Kuchiba's study is
very relevant to the present development strategy in Malaysia which is characterized
by a prevalence of organizational structures. Sometimes we tend to be lulled into the
belief that by creating more organizations and government agencies, development will
follow. To me, however, the proliferation oforganizations or the bureaucratic structural
differentiation must be followed by productivity in social, economic and political fields
as well as the re-distribution of peace, which facilitates increases in productivity, dis-
tribution of esteem, power and wealth among the people. Prof. Kuchiba's study poses
many questions to the relevance and validity ofsome of the rural development approaches
and thinking in the country, and Dr. Maeda's work reinforces in detail some of this
thinking. For instance, the blurring of village boundaries brings up the question of
relevance of the village or kampung as a unit of analysis or a unit of development activity.
Further, it raises the question of individual orientations versus universal orientation or
what Prof. Kuchiba and Dr. Maeda call guided interaction versus group orientation.
The settlement process of rice plains through history has to be studied to understand
the organizational structure of what now are called kampungs. Certainly these types
of kampungs are not formed on the same basis as the villages found in riverine valleys.
This has been shown very well in Zaharah Mahmud's thesis on the historical geography
of the Kedah Plain. We cannot, for instance, compare rice plain society and riverine
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rice society because the social structures are formed under different situations. Rice
plains in terms of historical geography are settled later than the riverine valleys and they
are formed under different social and geographic situations. The differences between
these two types of communities are very significant in the diffusion of innovation or new
technology or in terms of organizational activities that are being undertaken by the
Farmers' Organization Authority, MADA and KADA at present. Since we are using
an organizational strategy, it is very essential to discriminate between different types
of villages. This raises the point that Dr. Mohd. Nor Ghani mentioned: are the
present Jawatankuasa Kemajuan Kampung relevant in terms of development planning?
As I observe them in the Muda region, they are nothing more than a welfare group
for the extension of government assistance. They are not organizations which function
according to economic principles or have economic goals; they are a sort of interest
groups which articulate the interests of only certain sectors of rural society. The rele-
vant question is should we create another identity framework which transcends "village"
boundaries and which are functionally linked to the wider social, political and economic
network of the nation, of the region or of the state. For instance, the point mentioned
by Prof. Kuchiba about an increase in indebtedness among the padi peasants/in
Kampung Padang Lalang shows that the rice farmers are very much linked to the wider
economic framework, for instance, the banks, cooperative societies and other financial
institutions. If we accept the need to create another identity framework, I do not share
Prof. Kuchiba's worries about the prevalence of factionalism or Dr. Mohd. Nor's
worries about the prevalence of factionalism being a deterrent to rural development.
I see this factionalism as a precursor to the formation of a new organizational identity
framework. I believe in the functional role of conflict rather than the laissezjaire belief
that conflict breeds violence as we have seen in Baling in 1975. Individually oriented
farmers are early in adopting technological and other innovations. These are the
major positive elements currently prevalent in the rice plain communities in Krian,
Kemubu, Tanjung Karang and Muda. Conflict is, of course, an impediment to
organizational effort as mentioned by Prof. Kuchiba but in my experience, I find that
this is only a preliminary impediment. The point is that after a certain amount of
linkages are forged with the wider economic, poIitical and social framework, better
organizations are structured to facilitate the attainment of group goals.
I would like to conclude by saying that apart from having a differing philosophical
or epistemological foundation from those used in these studies, I must say that they have
managed to bring out many relevant questions pertaining to development and related
to academic issues. If we start thinking in another framework, not necessarily Marxist
but in terms of a dialectical framework, I think we can promote a development strategy
which does not necessarily follow the Japanese model nor the Western or Protestant Ethic
model but which will follow what we could call a Malaysian or Southeast Asian model.
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